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Abstract
We analyze a novel feedback mechanism between market and funding liquidity
that causes self-fulfilling liquidity dry-ups. Financial firms facing funding withdrawals
have an incentive to acquire information about their assets. Those with good assets
gain by resorting to outside liquidity sources and withhold assets from secondary
markets. This leads to adverse selection and lowers market prices. If prices fall by
enough, funding withdrawals are amplified and market and funding illiquidity become
mutually reinforcing. We compare different policy measures that can mitigate the
risk of inefficient liquidity dry-ups. While outright debt purchases can implement the
efficient allocation, liquidity injections may backfire and exacerbate adverse selection.
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1 Introduction
A distinctive feature of the 2007-08 financial crisis was the pronounced shortage of liquidity
in the “shadow banking” sector.1 The first strains emerged in the market for asset-backed
commercial paper (ABCP), a short-term financial instrument widely issued by shadow
banks to fund their holdings of long-term securitized assets. During the second half of
2007, nearly one half of ABCP issuers experienced a run (Covitz et al., 2013). At the same
time, the market for many securitized assets froze, forcing commercial and investment
banks that were sponsoring ABCP issuers off-balance sheet to absorb their assets back
onto their books.
What explains the sudden collapse of the shadow banking sector? After all, the shadow
banking system was considered a safe place to invest before the crisis. This was largely due
to liquidity and credit guarantees provided to shadow banks by their sponsoring financial
institutions (Pozsar et al., 2010). As a result, their debt was widely perceived as safe and
informationally insensitive: i.e. market participants felt little need to expend resources
to investigate the quality of the assets being financed.2 Gorton (2010) argues that the
collapse of the ABCP and other wholesale funding markets resulted from widespread
concerns about the value of shadow banks’ assets. As debt ceased to be informationally
insensitive, information frictions led to a collapse in market liquidity. Runs ensued due to
investors’ doubts about the solvency of the shadow banks and that of their sponsors.
This compelling view of the run on the shadow banking system leaves a number of
questions unanswered. First, what explains the sudden switch from a regime without
information production to a regime where it becomes profitable to acquire information?
In other words, what determines agents’ incentives to acquire information? Second, how
are these incentives affected by changes in market and funding liquidity? In particular,
1The term “shadow banks” employed in this paper refers to off-balance sheet conduits, e.g. Structured
Investment Vehicles (SIVs). These conduits are shell companies primarily used by commercial banks and
other financial institutions to avoid regulatory capital requirements imposed on assets directly booked on
their own balance sheet, including corporate loans and mortgages (Acharya et al., 2013b).
2Gorton & Pennacchi (1990) were the first to tie the liquidity properties of debt securities to their
“informational insensitivity.” In particular, they argue that banks and other financial institutions produce
such securities in order to protect uninformed investors from adverse selection.
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do funding withdrawals increase agents’ incentives to produce information? And does
information acquisition amplify these withdrawals? This paper proposes a theoretical
model that provides answers to these questions.
Overview of the Model. We consider a three-period model with three types of risk-
neutral agents: financial firms, wholesale creditors, and deep-pocketed investors. Financial
firms can be interpreted as structured investment vehicles (SIVs) or similar types of off-
balance sheet conduits. They enter the economy with long-term assets, financed by short-
and long-term debt. Assets differ in terms of their payoff at maturity: some yield a
high return (good), while others yield a low return (bad). Although assets’ return is
initially unknown, firms can expend resources in the initial period to privately learn their
asset’s future return.3 Creditors, which can be viewed as money market funds or other
wholesale investors, hold the long- and short-term debt. They are subject to idiosyncratic
preference shocks that may lead them to withdraw their short-term claims before firms’
assets mature. In the intermediate period, a competitive market opens where firms can
sell assets to investors to obtain liquidity.4
Motivated by the institutional arrangements of SIVs, we assume that firms benefit
from recourse to the balance sheet of an outside sponsoring institution. This recourse
arises in two ways. First, instead of selling assets, firms can access a private liquidity line
in the intermediate period at a fixed cost per unit of liquidity withdrawn. Second, the
sponsoring institutions provide firms with a partial credit enhancement that guarantees a
fraction of creditors’ outstanding debt.5
3The assumption that firms do not know the return of their assets ex ante is motivated by the fact that
SIVs hold highly complex and opaque securitized assets, a large share of which have not been originated
by their sponsoring institution but by other financial intermediaries (Pozsar et al., 2010).
4SIVs rely on so-called “dynamic liquidity management” strategies to manage their funding risk, mean-
ing that they sell assets in order to obtain liquidity when unable to roll over maturing commercial paper
(Covitz et al., 2013).
5These assumptions closely mirror the guarantees that conduits benefit from in practice. These include
liquidity enhancements, or private liquidity lines through which sponsoring institutions repurchase per-
forming assets if conduits fail to roll over maturing commercial paper. Conduits also benefit from credit
enhancements, or commitments on the part of their sponsoring financial institutions to cover losses on
non-performing assets. A distinctive feature of SIVs, compared to other conduits, is that these credit
guarantees only cover a fraction of their outstanding liabilities. SIVs therefore also issue longer term
liabilities, e.g. medium term notes, in order to compensate for their higher risk (Acharya et al., 2013b).
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Firms’ balance sheet structure implies that they are subject to a standard maturity
mismatch problem, as funding may be withdrawn before assets mature. To cover these
withdrawals, firms must decide whether to obtain the required liquidity by selling assets or
by tapping their outside liquidity source. The value from acquiring information in this en-
vironment stems from firms’ ability to hold on to good assets by resorting to their liquidity
lines rather than selling them at a relatively low price.6 Information acquisition thereby
leads to an adverse selection problem in secondary markets that impedes the provision
of market-based liquidity (i.e. lowers asset prices).7 This leads to a novel feedback from
market prices to information acquisition as lower prices reduce firms’ opportunity costs of
using their liquidity lines if they know they have good assets.
Firms’ access to outside liquidity lines induces strategic complementarities in informa-
tion acquisition which can, in turn, generate self-fulfilling dry-ups in market liquidity. To
illustrate the underlying mechanism, suppose a firm faces withdrawals and believes that
others have acquired information (see Figure 1). If informed firms with good assets opt to
use their liquidity lines, the relative share of bad assets in the secondary market increases,
and assets trade at a price below their ex ante expected value. This “lemons discount”
increases the value from withholding good assets from the market, and a fortiori, the
gain from acquiring information. Hence, the mere belief that others acquire information
increases each firm’s individual incentive to do so, spurring self-fulfilling market illiquidity.
This information-induced market illiquidity can also amplify firms’ funding liquidity
risk by increasing creditors’ incentives to withdraw their short-term debt. Given the
credit guarantees provided by firms’ sponsoring institutions, creditors always obtain the
full face value of their debt if assets trade at their ex ante expected value. When prices
are high, creditors’ withdrawal decisions only depend on their relative preference for early
or late consumption. However, firms relying on the market to obtain liquidity have to
sell increasingly large quantities of assets as the price falls, eroding the residual value of
6As in Hirshleifer (1971), information acquisition has no social value in our model as it only serves to
redistribute rents across agents and does not affect the productive capacity of the economy.
7Contrary to standard “lemons” models à la Akerlof (1970) the degree of asymmetric information in
our model is endogenous as it is determined by firms’ information acquisition decisions.
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their assets. As the credit guarantees only cover a fraction of outstanding debt, creditors
may therefore incur losses if assets trade at a sufficiently low price. In this case, early
withdrawals dilute late creditors’ claims and increase each creditor’s individual incentive to
withdraw early.8 Additional withdrawals increase firms’ incentives to acquire information,
which further pushes down the price, sparking additional withdrawals, etc. For sufficiently
low prices, market illiquidity thus spills over and amplifies firms’ funding liquidity risk.9
The strategic complementarities in firms’ information acquisition and creditors’ with-
drawal decisions can lead to multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria. Equilibria without informa-
tion acquisition are characterized by high secondary market prices and low roll–over risk.
Equilibria with information acquisition are instead characterized by low market prices and
sudden withdrawals of short-term funding. In order to select a unique equilibrium and
study the effects of different types of policy interventions, we employ global game tech-
niques, adapting the methodology of Goldstein (2005).10 Previewing our results, we show
8The channel leading to strategic complementarities in creditors’ withdrawal decisions is conceptually
similar to the mechanism studied by Brunnermeier & Oehmke (2013) to model the unraveling of firms’
debt maturity structure.
9Brunnermeier & Pedersen (2009) also study this link. However, the interaction between market and
funding liquidity in their model stems from margin requirements imposed on traders and the feedback
from higher margins on market liquidity.
10The global games refinement embeds a complete information game with multiple equilibria into an
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that depending on the parameters of the model, two different regimes can occur: a weak
dependence and a strong dependence regime. In the former, withdrawals of short-term
creditors can spur firms to acquire information and thereby lead to a dry-up in market liq-
uidity. However, no reverse feedback exists and firms’ funding liquidity risk only depends
on creditors’ idiosyncratic preference shocks. In the latter regime, market and funding
illiquidity mutually reinforce each other. In particular, the belief of not obtaining the full
face value of their debt leads short-term creditors to withdraw in more states than those
justified by their idiosyncratic preference shocks (see Figure 1).
We analyze a number of policy measures that can be used to mitigate these inefficient
liquidity dry-ups. Inspired by the measures adopted by the Federal Reserve in 2007-08 to
shore up wholesale funding markets, we focus on four specific policy interventions: creditor
guarantees, asset purchases, liquidity injections and outright debt purchases. We obtain
three key results. First, asset purchases are more cost-effective than public creditor guar-
antees if the policymaker’s objective is to shield creditors from losses when firms default.
Second, if the policymaker’s objective is to boost both market and funding liquidity, then
outright debt purchases can implement the efficient allocation. Lastly, liquidity injections
that reduce the cost of outside liquidity lines can backfire as they exacerbate the adverse
selection problem that causes market liquidity to dry-up in the first place.
In general, our model provides a new framework studying the interaction between
market liquidity, information acquisition and roll-over risk that helps explain the fragility
of the shadow banking sector. Our paper differs from most of the existing bank run
literature as we focus on collateralized debt markets.11 In particular, the presence of credit
enhancements imply that bank debt is safe as long as market liquidity is abundant - i.e.
there is no strategic coordination problem among creditors when prices are high because
their claims are individually backed by firms’ sponsors.12 Creditor runs only emerge in
incomplete information environment and allows to explicitly model agents’ strategic uncertainty. See
Carlsson & van Damme (1993); Morris & Shin (2003).
11See Diamond & Dybvig (1983) and Goldstein & Pauzner (2005) for classic bank run models with
demand deposits. Another paper studying the fragility of collateralized short-term debt markets is Kuong
(2015). The source of fragility in his paper differs from ours as it relies on the feedback between initial
margins and the market value of collateral.
12In standard bank run models, the structure of deposit contracts immediately leads to strategic con-
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our framework because information acquisition leads to an adverse selection problem in
secondary markets, leading to dry-ups in market liquidity. Our paper therefore highlights
the fragility of financial institutions that heavily rely on market-based liquidity provision
to manage their funding liquidity risk.
Related Literature. Our paper relates to a growing literature on information acquisi-
tion in financial markets. Dang et al. (2013) show that the value of information acquisition
for a seller is the minimum of either the information rent from selling a low payoff security
at a high price, or the gain from not selling a high payoff security at a low price. In our
model, firms’ surplus from information acquisition is similar to the latter. In contrast to
Dang et al., who solve an optimal security design problem, we study the feedback be-
tween information acquisition incentives and market prices when assets are traded in a
competitive secondary market.
Dang et al. (2015) study information acquisition by buyers. Gorton & Ordonez (2014)
use this framework as the backbone of a dynamic model where heterogenous collateral
of unknown quality needs to be used to support lending. The value of information in
their model corresponds to an information rent that accrues to creditors from liquidating
bad collateral at a pooling price.13 Importantly, the feedback between market prices and
information acquisition stemming from this information rent induces strategic substitu-
tatbility (rather than strategic complementarity) in information production. Hence, the
self-fulfilling liquidity dry-ups that are the focus of our paper cannot arise in Gorton &
Ordonez’s model.
Bolton et al. (2015) analyze investors’ incentives to acquire information about assets
that trade in over-the-counter (OTC) markets. They show that information acquisition
generates a negative externality as investors that acquire information “cream skim” good
assets from the market, thereby worsening the residual pool of assets offered to uninformed
siderations in withdrawal decisions due to their first-come-first-served nature. It is less clear why such
considerations apply to collateralized debt contracts, hence the difficulty of using standard bank run mod-
els to explain the run on ABCP issuers during the 2007-08 financial crisis (Gorton, 2012).
13Such an information rent also arises in our model if we dispense with the assumption that trading
volumes are observable. See Appendix A2 for more details.
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investors. In a related model, Fishman & Parker (2015) show how strategic complemen-
tarities in information production can give rise to multiple equilibria. The mechanism
responsible for this multiplicity is conceptually different from the one studied here as it
operates through the rents informed investors extract when buying assets. Feijer (2015)
considers the interaction between information acquisition and contracting frictions caused
by a risk-shifting problem. The feedback mechanism in his model is distinct from the one
here, as it operates through initial borrowing costs rather than the price at which assets
are sold in secondary markets.
Our paper also builds on the literature studying how adverse selection can lead to
self-fulfilling market freezes. Malherbe (2014), building on Eisfeldt (2004), shows how
liquidity hoarding imposes a negative pecuniary externality on secondary market traders
by exacerbating adverse selection frictions. This externality can lead to self-fulfilling dry-
ups in secondary market liquidity. The channel through which this occurs is noticeably
different than in our model as it depends on the return agents enjoy from holding cash.
Plantin (2009) shows that “learning by holding”, i.e. obtaining private information by
holding an asset, can lead to a coordination problem among investors who face exogenous
liquidity shocks. In contrast, liquidity shocks in our model are endogenously determined
by creditors’ decisions to roll over their claims, which allows us to study the link between
market and funding liquidity.
Finally, our paper also draws from the large literature on global games that interprets
liquidity dry-ups as the result of a coordination failure.14 Our paper explores a novel
channel as it explicitly ties market liquidity risk to an adverse selection problem caused by
firms’ information acquisition behavior. Moreover, our model deviates from most global
game models as it features strategic complementarities within and across two groups of
agents. Methodologically, our analysis is closely related to the twin crises model of Gold-
stein (2005) who first extended global game techniques to a setting with two types of
agents and a common fundamental.
14See Morris & Shin (2004a); Rochet & Vives (2004); Eisenbach (2013) for bank and creditor runs, or
Morris & Shin (2004b) for market dry-ups.
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2 Model
2.1 Description of the Economy
We consider a three period exchange economy, with time indexed by t ∈ {0, 1, 2}. The
economy is populated by a continuum of risk-neutral firms indexed by j ∈ [0, 1], and a
continuum of risk-neutral creditors indexed by i ∈ [0, 1].
Firms. Each firm is endowed with a risky long-term asset that returns R̃ ∈ {Rl, Rh} in
t = 2, where Rh > Rl and π ≡ Pr(R̃ = Rh). The ex ante expected return of the asset is
E0[R̃] = πRh + (1− π)Rl
In t = 0, each firm has the option to acquire private information about the future return of
its asset. For simplicity, we assume that by acquiring information firms perfectly observe
the future return of their asset. We denote by Ωj ∈ {n, h, l} firm j’s information set
conditional on not acquiring information (n), or acquiring information and verifying asset
returns to be high (h) or low (l). Correspondingly, E[R̃|Ωj ] ∈ {E0[R̃], Rh, Rl} denotes
firms’ beliefs about their asset’s return at maturity given their information set.
Information acquisition requires firms to incur a fixed cost ψ > 0. These costs can
be interpreted as the value of an outside investment opportunity that firms forgo if they
invest in information acquisition. Let σj ∈ [0, 1] denote the probability that firm j acquires
information, and denote by σ ∈ [0, 1] the fraction of firms acquiring information.
Creditors. Creditors hold legacy debt previously issued by firms to finance their assets.
A fraction (1− α) of this debt is long-term and cannot be withdrawn before t = 2, while
a fraction α is short-term and can be withdrawn upon demand. Creditors that withdraw
in t = 1 obtain D1. Creditors that withdraw in t = 2 obtain D2 > D1 if the firm is able to
repay the full face value of the debt, and some (endogenous) recovery value ` otherwise.
Creditors are subject to idiosyncratic liquidity shocks at the beginning of t = 1 that
9
affect their valuation for t = 2 consumption. Formally, creditors’ preferences are







where η > 0. This variable can be interpreted as cash inflows that reduce creditors’
liquidity needs in t = 1. Similarly, interpreting η̂ > 0 as (deterministic) cash outflows,
the difference η̂ − η corresponds to creditors’ net outflows. The magnitude of these net
outflows determines creditors’ marginal rate of substitution between consumption in t = 1
and t = 2. Let λi ∈ [0, 1] denote the probability that creditor i withdraws his funds, and
denote by λ ∈ [0, 1] the fraction of creditors withdrawing in t = 1.
Market Structure. The balance sheet structure described above implies that firms are
subject to a standard maturity mismatch problem: while asset returns do not realize until
t = 2, firms must meet funding withdrawals in t = 1. Firms can meet these withdrawals in
one of two ways. First, they can access a private liquidity line at the cost of β−1 > 1 per
unit of funds withdrawn.15 Second, they can sell asset shares on a (competitive) secondary
market that opens in t = 1. The buyers in the secondary market are deep-pocketed risk-
neutral investors who purchase assets at the price p = E1[R̃] ≥ Rl, where E1[·] denotes
investors’ expectations about asset returns at the beginning of t = 1. Figure 2 summarizes
the timing of the model.
Default Risk. We assume that firms are ex ante solvent but that the face value of their
debt exceeds the return on bad assets. Formally: E0[R̃] > D2 and Rl < D1. In line with
the institutional features of SIVs discussed above, we assume that each firm benefits from
a partial credit enhancement provided by an (outside) sponsoring financial institution. In
particular, if the face value of outstanding debt exceeds firms’ cash flows in either t = 1
15The assumption that liquidity lines are costly is realistic, and can be justified for a number of reasons.
For example, tapping liquidity lines may imply that the sponsoring financial institution must pass on
valuable investment opportunities in order to access the required liquidity. Notwithstanding these costs,
firms may prefer to use liquidity lines rather than maintaining cash balances since liquidity lines allow
firms to avoid paying the liquidity premium implied by holding liquid assets in states of the world where
they do not face a liquidity shortfall (Acharya et al., 2013a).
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Figure 2: Sequence of Events





t = 0 t = 1
• Creditors withdraw or roll
over.
• Firms decide to use
liquidity line or asset sales
to cover withdrawals
• Market opens and
assets trade at price p.
t = 2




or t = 2, the sponsor guarantees losses up to a maximum value of (D2 − Rl) per claim,
while losses in excess of (D2 −Rl) are borne by creditors.16
The credit enhancement ensures that firms never default in t = 1 so that short-term
debt is safe.17 Debt that matures in t = 2, however, may not be safe. If too many assets
are sold at low prices in t = 1, the residual value of firms’ assets (after selling αλD1/p
shares) may fall below the value guaranteed by the credit enhancement. Formally, firms
default in t = 2 whenever the per capita value of their assets falls below Rl. That is,
Ri max
{
1− αλD1p , 0
}
1− αλ
< Rl, ∀i ∈ {h, l}
Because of this default risk, remaining creditors in t = 2 obtain
`i(p) = D2 −max
Rl − Ri max
{




 , ∀i ∈ {h, l} (2)
Equation (2) implies that firms never default if p ≥ D1. If p < D1, then firms with bad
16Together with being a realistic institutional feature of ABCP conduits, the credit enhancements imply
that creditors’ withdraw decisions are global strategic complements. See the discussion in Appendix A2.
17Even if early withdrawals cannot be fully covered by selling all assets, the credit enhancement is always









assets always default while those with good assets only default if the fraction of short-term
debt is sufficiently high. To simplify the exposition of the model, we impose the following
assumption on firms’ debt maturity structure.
Assumption 1. The fraction of short-term debt is such that




, where ρ ≡ RlRh
This assumption ensures that the fraction of long-term debt is sufficiently large so
that firms with good assets never default: i.e. `h(p) = D2 for all p ≥ Rl.18 It also
implies that firms opting to finance outflows using asset sales are always able to meet
early withdrawals in full, even if all short-term creditors withdraw (λ = 1) and asset
prices are at their lower bound (p = Rl). Hence, the assumption ensures that the credit
enhancement is never triggered in t = 1.
2.2 Liquidity Lines versus Asset Sales
Firms need liquidity to cover withdrawals in t = 1. They can obtain liquidity in one of two
ways, either by selling assets in the market or by resorting to their sponsor’s liquidity line
at a per unit cost of β−1. Firms choose between asset sales or outside liquidity in order
to maximize their profits. Given Assumption 1, the value of a firm that faces withdrawals
of αλD1 and covers these by selling assets is





− (1− αλ)E[˜̀(p)|Ωj ] (3)
If instead firms resort to the liquidity line, the cash flows from their assets in t = 2
are unaffected. This implies that the credit enhancements cover the full face value of
outstanding liabilities in t = 2 even if asset returns are low. Firms using their costly
liquidity lines therefore never default on their debt. The value of firms using their liquidity
18This is a simplifying assumption and does not affect the qualitative nature of our results. In partic-
ular, firms’ information acquisition choice and creditors’ withdraw decisions still exhibit global strategic
complementarities even if we allow for default of firms with good assets. See Appendix A2.
12
lines is equal to
V LL(Ωj ;β) = E[R̃|Ωj ]−
αλD1
β
− (1− αλ)D2 (4)
It follows from equations (3) and (4) that firms’ preference between liquidity lines and
asset sales depends on the secondary market price, p. In order to fix their preference
ordering, we impose the following assumption on asset returns.











⇔ βRh > E0[R̃] and βE0[R̃] < Rl
The upper bound on ρ corresponds to a standard “lemons condition.” It implies that
even if assets trade at their ex ante expected value (p = E0[R̃]), informed firms holding
good assets prefer to meet early withdrawals by tapping their liquidity lines. The lower
bound on ρ, on the other hand, implies that even if assets trade at the lowest price (p = Rl),
uninformed firms still prefer to meet early withdrawals by selling assets.19
Lemma 1. Given Assumptions 1 and 2, informed good firms always prefer the liquidity
line, while informed bad firms and uninformed firms always prefer asset sales.
2.3 Secondary Market Price
Given firms’ choice between liquidity lines and asset sales, we now turn to the determina-
tion of the secondary market price. Investors that purchase assets in the secondary market
must break even. Their participation constraint is given by
p ≤ E1[R̃] = τRh + (1− τ)Rl (5)
where τ ∈ [0, 1] denotes the fraction of good assets that are supplied to the market.
Competition among investors ensures that condition (5) holds with equality in equilibrium.
19 This assumption guarantees the existence of an equilibrium in firms’ information acquisition game.
Relaxing the lower bound on ρ breaks the global strategic complementarities in firms’ information acqui-
sition choice. See the discussion in Appendix A2.
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Given Lemma 1, only uninformed and informed bad firms supply their assets to the
market, since informed good firms always prefer to use their liquidity line. Hence, whenever
some firms acquire information, the share of good assets traded in the secondary market
will be strictly less than the share of good assets in the economy: i.e. τ < π. This implies
that uninformed firms will never choose to sell more than αλD1/p shares, as their assets’
expected return E0[R̃] strictly exceeds the market price.
As some firms may be better informed about their assets’ return than investors, the
secondary market price also depends on whether or not investors can observe firms’ order
flows. We assume here that firms cannot split their sales, implying that trading volumes
are observable.20 Consequently, bad firms cannot sell more than αλD1/p shares since
otherwise investors would be able to infer assets’ return based on the quantity firms supply





and the market price (5) can be rewritten as
p(σ) = E0[R̃]− (π − τ(σ))(Rh −Rl)
Notice that the share of good assets traded in the market is strictly decreasing in the
fraction of informed firms, i.e. τ ′(σ) < 0. By acquiring information, firms effectively
introduce a degree of asymmetric information into the economy, which leads informed
firms with good assets to withhold these from the market. The resulting adverse selection
problem leads assets to trade at a discount.
Lemma 2. The secondary market price is strictly decreasing in the fraction of informed
firms: i.e. p′(σ) < 0.
20Relaxing this assumption introduces an additional motive for acquiring information; namely, the ability
to sell bad assets at the (relatively high) pooling price. See Appendix A2 for a discussion.
14
2.4 Information Acquisition Game
We begin by characterizing firms’ optimal information acquisition choice for a given frac-
tion of early withdrawals. Firms’ information acquisition decision in t = 0 induces a
distribution of informed and uninformed firms in the economy. Given their beliefs about
the fraction of informed firms, investors update their beliefs about the share of good assets
supplied to the secondary market. In equilibrium, firms’ information acquisition choice
and the resulting equilibrium price have to be mutually consistent.
In what follows, it will be useful to express firm j’s best response σ∗j (σ) in terms of
the expected surplus from acquiring information. Given Lemma 1, if a firm does not
acquire information, it prefers to meet early withdrawals by selling assets. The value of
remaining uninformed is therefore equal to V AS(n; p). If a firm acquires information, then
with probability π the asset is verified to be good, and with probability 1 − π the asset
is verified to be bad. Again, by Lemma 1, good firms always prefer to use their liquidity
lines, while bad firms opt to sell assets. The expected surplus from acquiring information
is therefore given by
S(σ;λ) ≡ πV LL(h;β) + (1− π)V AS(l; p)− V AS(n; p)









The value from acquiring information consists of the option value from holding good assets
rather than selling them at the (relatively low) pooling price.21 It arises because informed
firms with good assets prefer to meet early withdrawals using their liquidity lines.
As shown by Lemma 2, the market price declines as more firms become informed.
This lowers the opportunity cost of using liquidity lines and increases the value from
acquiring information and withholding good assets from the market. This implies that
21Default (of bad firms) does not affect the surplus from acquiring information since it symmetrically
lowers the expected t = 2 repayment for both informed bad and uninformed firms.
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firms’ information acquisition choices are strategic complements: firm j’s incentive to
acquire information is increasing in the fraction of informed firms.
Lemma 3. Firms’ surplus from acquiring information is strictly increasing in the fraction
of informed firms: i.e. Sσ(σ;λ) > 0.
We characterize the equilibrium of the information acquisition game in terms of the
cost parameter, ψ. Firm j’s best respondence correspondence must satisfy
σ∗j (σ) =

0 if S(σ;λ) < ψ
∈ (0, 1) if S(σ;λ) = ψ
1 if S(σ;λ) > ψ
We focus on symmetric equilibria whereby all firms adopt the same strategy in t = 0.
Solving for the equilibrium therefore reduces to solving the fixed point σ∗j (σ) = σ.
22
Proposition 1. There exist threshold costs ψ(λ) ≡ S(0;λ) and ψ(λ) ≡ S(1;λ) such that
ψ(λ) < ψ(λ) for all λ. The equilibria of the information acquisition game are:
1. No information acquisition, σ∗ = 0, where assets trade at the ex ante pooling price
p∗(0) = E0(R̃) if and only if ψ ≥ ψ(λ);
2. Partial information acquisition, σ∗ ∈ (0, 1), such that p∗(σ∗) ∈ (Rl,E0[R̃]) if and
only if ψ ∈ (ψ(λ), ψ(λ));
3. Full information acquisition, σ∗ = 1, where the asset price collapses to p∗(1) = Rl if
and only if ψ ≤ ψ(λ).
There exist multiple equilibria for values of ψ ∈ (ψ(λ), ψ(λ)).
For ψ > ψ, information costs are so high that firms never acquire information, imply-
ing that assets trade at the ex ante pooling price E0[R̃] and all firms use the secondary
22Since the surplus function (7) is continuous in σ, it follows that firms’ best response correspondence
σ∗j (σ) is convex valued and has a closed graph. The existence of a fixed point thus follows directly from
application of Kakutani’s fixed point theorem.
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market to meet early withdraws. For ψ < ψ, information costs are so low that firms always
acquire information, leading good assets to be withheld from the market and the price to
fall to Rl. For ψ ∈ (ψ,ψ), multiple equilibria arise due to strategic complementaries in
information acquisition. In particular, if a firm believes that others acquire information,
it expects the market price to fall below E0[R̃]. This raises its expected surplus from
acquiring information. Because of strategic complementarities in information acquisition,
the fraction of informed firms must increase, thereby lowering the market price and vin-
dicating the initially held belief. We refer to this type of phenomena as a self-fulfilling
(market) liquidity dry-up. Figure 3 plots firms’ surplus function in terms of σ.
A distinctive feature of firms’ information acquisition incentives is that they are strictly
increasing in the fraction of debt that is withdrawn in t = 1. Higher withdrawals increase
the option value of holding good assets since informed firms avoid selling more of these at
the pooling price.
Lemma 4. The surplus from acquiring information is strictly increasing in the fraction
of early withdrawals: i.e. Sλ(σ;λ) > 0.
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2.5 Roll–Over Game
We now characterize the roll over/withdrawal decision of short-term creditors for a given
fraction of informed firms. Recall that creditors’ preferences (1) imply that their marginal
rate of substitution between t = 1 and t = 2 consumption depends on the magnitude of
their net outflows, η̂− η. Given the debt contract (D1, D2) and the value of claims in case
of default (2), creditors choose to withdraw their funds in t = 1 whenever
D1 + (η̂ − η) > E1[min{D2, ˜̀(p)}]
Using equation (2), creditors’ expected surplus from withdrawing early equals
W (λ;σ) = D1 − (D2 −X(λ;σ)) (8)
where








corresponds to creditors’ loss-given-default. For prices above D1, firms never default and
creditors always receive the full face value of their claims if they roll over. If prices fall
below D1, however, outstanding creditors in t = 2 take a haircut on claims held against
firms with bad assets.
As in the information acquisition game, creditors’ withdraw decisions can be strategic
complements. The presence of strategic complementarities depends on the price at which
firms sell assets in the secondary market. When p ≥ D1, firms have to sell assets less
than one-for-one to match the withdrawals of early creditors. Regardless of the amount
of early withdrawals, firms – supported by the credit enhancement that protects creditors
from assets’ “fundamental” risk – always have sufficient funds to pay back late creditors
in full. In this case, creditor i’s payoff from withdrawing is independent of other creditors’
withdrawal decision.
This strategic independence among creditors’ roll over decisions does not carry through
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Figure 4: Surplus from withdrawing W (λ) for fixed σ.
λ





Panel (a): Case where p(σ) ≥ D1.
λ





η ∈ [η, η]
Panel (b): Case where p(σ) < D1.
when p < D1. In this case, firms have to sell assets more than one-for-one to meet
early withdrawals, leading the residual value of firms’ assets to decline if they meet these
withdrawals by selling assets. Notwithstanding the credit enhancements, firms with bad
assets are unable to repay late creditors the full face value of their claims in t = 2.
Importantly, creditors’ loss-given-default is increasing in the fraction of early withdrawals
since more assets must be sold as λ increases. This explains the strategic complementarity
in creditors’ decisions: i.e. creditor i’s incentive to withdraw is strictly increasing in
the fraction of early withdrawals in t = 1. Figure 4 depicts these two cases by plotting
creditors’ surplus function in terms of λ.
Lemma 5. Creditors’ surplus from withdrawing funds early is weakly increasing in the
fraction of withdrawals: i.e. Wλ(λ;σ) ≥ 0.
We characterize the equilibrium in terms of creditors’ net inflows, η− η̂. If net inflows
are high, then creditors always prefer consumption in t = 2 compared to t = 1. If, instead,
net inflows are low, then creditors prefer consuming in t = 1 rather than t = 2. Creditor
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i’s best respondence correspondence therefore satisfies
λ∗i (λ) =

0 if W (λ;σ) < η − η̂
∈ (0, 1) if W (λ;σ) = η − η̂
1 if W (λ;σ) > η − η̂
As for the information acquisition game, we focus on symmetric equilibria where all cred-
itors adopt the same strategy in t = 1.23
Proposition 2. There exist thresholds η ≡ W (0;σ) > 0 and η(σ) ≡ W (1;σ) > 0 such
that η < η(σ) if and only if p(σ) < D1. The equilibria of the roll over game are:
1. No withdrawals, λ∗ = 0, if and only if η > η.
2. Partial withdrawals, λ∗ ∈ (0, 1), if and only if η ∈ (η,max{η, η(σ)}).
3. Full withdrawals, λ∗ = 1, if and only if η < max{η, η(σ)}.
When p(σ) < D1, there exist multiple equilibria for values of η ∈ (η, η(σ)).
Similarly to firms’ information acquisition incentives, which depend on the fraction of
early withdrawals, creditors’ withdrawal incentives also depend on the fraction of informed
firms via its effect on the secondary market price. As more firms acquire information, the
market price decreases due to informed firms withholding good assets from the market.
This increases the quantity of assets that must be sold to meet early withdrawals, and
thereby raises creditors’ loss-given-default when asset returns are low.
Lemma 6. The surplus from withdrawing early is weakly increasing in the fraction of
informed agents: i.e. Wσ(λ;σ) ≥ 0.
23As for the information acquisition game, the existence of an equilibrium is guaranteed by application
of Kakutani’s fixed point theorem.
20
3 Unique Equilibrium
The model exhibits two forms of strategic complementarities. The first relates to strategic
complementarities within groups of agents. In particular, firms’ incentives to acquire
information are increasing in the fraction of informed firms. Similarly, creditors’ incentives
to withdraw their funds are increasing in the fraction of early withdrawals. Strategic
complementarities also operate between groups of agents: i.e. firms’ incentives to acquire
information (creditors’ incentives to withdraw their funds early) are increasing in the
fraction of early withdrawals (the fraction of informed firms).
These strategic complementarities can give rise to multiple equilibria. For intermediate
values of ψ and η, the optimal behavior of agents depends on their beliefs about the
behavior of other agents. In particular, beliefs by firms and creditors that all creditors
roll over and no firm acquires information lead to an equilibrium where asset markets are
liquid and short-term debt is rolled over. The opposite beliefs – i.e. that all firms acquire
information and all creditors withdraw – give rise to another equilibrium where market
and funding liquidity both dry up. Both equilibria are self-fulfilling in the sense that the
equilibrium outcomes vindicate agents’ initial beliefs. This equilibrium indeterminacy is a
consequence of the assumption that the model and its parameters are common knowledge
and that agents can perfectly coordinate their actions and beliefs in equilibrium (Morris
& Shin, 2003).
3.1 Global Game Environment
Private Types. To overcome this equilibrium indeterminacy, we abandon the assump-
tion of common knowledge about ψ and η and instead assume that firms have idiosyncratic
opportunity costs and creditors face idiosyncratic inflows in t = 1. Formally, we assume
that agents’ types are given by
ψj = θ + εj and ηi = θ + εi
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where εk ∼ U [−ε, ε] for all k ∈ {i, j} and θ ∼ U [θ, θ]. The common component θ can be in-
terpreted as a macroeconomic state that simultaneously affects all firms’ opportunity costs
and all creditors’ cash inflows, and εk as an idiosyncratic component affecting only agent
k.24 While the distributions of both components are common knowledge, their respective
realizations are not. Thus, even though firms and creditors observe their respective types,
they are uncertain about their position in the overall distribution of types, and hence face
uncertainty about the behavior of other agents.
Strategies and Payoffs. In this modified model, a strategy for agent k consists of a
mapping sk : R+ → {0, 1} that assigns to each type a decision of whether or not to acquire
information (for firms) or to withdraw funds (for creditors). Each group of agents uses
symmetric strategies when sj(·) = sf (·) for all j and si(·) = sc(·) for all i. Strategies are
said to be monotone when {sf (·), sc(·)} can be summarized by joint thresholds {ψ∗ε , η∗ε }
such that agents acquire information or withdraw their funds if and only if their types
are below their respective threshold. In what follows, we restrict attention to equilibria in
monotone strategies.25
If agents use montone strategies around the thresholds ψ∗ε and η
∗
ε , the law of large
numbers implies that the fraction of informed firms and the fraction of early withdrawals
(given some realization of the state variable θ) are equal to
σ(θ, ψ∗ε ) = Pr(ψj < ψ
∗
ε |θ) = F
(




and λ(θ, η∗ε ) = Pr(ηi < η
∗
ε |θ) = F
(
η∗ε − θ + ε
2ε
)
where F (x) = min{max{x, 0}, 1}. The surplus from acquiring information for a firm of




ε ))|ψj ] and the surplus from withdrawing for a creditor





24For simplicity, we assume that these idiosyncratic components are identically distributed across groups.
These distributional assumptions are only made for the sake of analytical convenience.
25As shown in Proposition 3, this restriction is without loss of generality.
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3.2 Equilibrium Characterization
To constitute a monotone equilibrium, the thresholds (ψ∗ε , η
∗
ε ) must be such that agents
whose types are just equal to the thresholds are indifferent between either action. That
is, the thresholds simultaneously solve




ε ))|ψ∗ε ] and η∗ε = Eθ[W (λ(θ, η∗ε );σ(θ, ψ∗ε ))|η∗ε ] (10)
Given the uniform prior assumptions, the posterior distribution of θ for an agent of type
φ∗ ∈ {ψ∗ε , η∗ε } is uniform over [φ∗ − ε, φ∗ + ε]. The expected surplus from acquiring infor-










S(σ(θ, ψ∗ε ), λ(θ, η
∗
ε )) dθ















Similarly, expressing creditors’ indifference condition in terms of λ, we obtain
η∗ε (ψ
∗





















and σD ≡ E0[R̃]−D1π(Rh−D1) is such that p(σ
D) = D1.
The thresholds defined by conditions (11) and (12) are bounded from above and from
below. These bounds are given by agents’ expected surplus under “extreme beliefs.” For
firms, they correspond to the expected surplus from acquiring information if firms believe
no (every) creditor withdraws. Similarly, for creditors, they correspond to the expected
surplus from withdrawing if creditors believe no (every) firm acquires information. Using
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S (σ, 1) dσ,




Assumption 3. The volume of outflows is such that η̂ > D2 −D1.
Assumption 3 ensures the existence of a strict lower dominance region in creditors’ roll-
over game. It implies that there exists values of the state variable θ such that creditors
find it optimal to withdraw their funds, irrespective of the withdraw decision of other
creditors or the information acquisition choice of firms.26





ε ). The presence of strategic complementarities within and across groups implies that
ψ∗ε (η
∗






ε ) weakly increases in ψ
∗
ε . Thus, when creditors
choose to roll over for a larger set of states (i.e. lower their threshold), this leads firms
to acquire information for a smaller set of states, and vice versa if η∗ε increases in ψ
∗
ε .
This can lead market and funding liquidity to be mutually reinforcing. Figure 3 plots the
optimal threshold functions for both firms and creditors.
Proposition 3. Under Assumption 3, there exists a unique equilibrium in monotone
strategies and equilibrium thresholds are such that ψ∗ε ≤ η∗ε . Moreover, there are no other
equilibria in non-monotone strategies.
3.3 Global Game Solution
To facilitate the characterization of the equilibrium, we focus on the global game solution
where the idiosyncratic component becomes negligibly small, ε → 0. In this case, the
equilibrium behavior of agents becomes degenerate around the realized state. In particular,
all firms acquire information if and only if θ ≤ ψ∗ε and abstain from information acquisition
26Our results do not require net outflows to be large. That is, we can have η̂ ≤ η(θ) in almost all
states. What is important is that there exist at least some values of θ such that creditors strictly prefer
consumption in t = 1 relative to consumption in t = 2 even if D2 > D1.
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otherwise. Similarly, all creditors choose to withdraw their funds if and only if θ ≤ η∗ε and
otherwise always roll over their debt. The equilibrium outcome depends on the ordering
of the extreme bounds. There are two cases to consider: ψ
∗
< η∗ and η∗ < ψ
∗
. Following
the terminology of Goldstein (2005), we refer to the former as a weak dependence regime
and to the latter as a strong dependence regime.
Proposition 4. For vanishing noise, the equilibrium thresholds ψ∗ε and η
∗
ε are such that
1. Weak dependence: ψ∗ε → ψ
∗
and η∗ε → η∗ as ε→ 0 if and only if ψ
∗
< η∗.
2. Strong dependence: ψ∗ε → η∗ε and η∗ε → η∗ ∈ [η∗, ψ
∗
] as ε→ 0 if and only if ψ∗ ≥ η∗.
In the weak dependence regime, creditors’ equilibrium threshold is at its lower bound
(η∗). Withdrawal decisions in this case are purely driven by creditors’ idiosyncratic bal-
ance sheet shocks and are unaffected by firms’ information acquisition behavior. These
“fundamental” withdrawals are nonetheless sufficient to incentivize firms to acquire in-
formation whenever θ < ψ
∗
. However, for values of θ ∈ (ψ∗, η∗), firms find it optimal
to abstain from information acquisition despite creditors continuing to withdraw their
short-term debt. Funding outflows in this case are covered by asset sales at the ex ante
25










pooling price E0[R̃], implying that no firm defaults since the cash flow generated by their
residual assets (plus the credit guarantees) always suffice to pay off outstanding debt in
t = 2. Hence, in the weak dependence case, the coordination failure in firms’ information
acquisition does not amplify funding withdrawals (see Figure 4).
Things are different in the strong dependence regime, where firms’ and creditors’ thresh-
olds converge such that ψ∗ → η∗. In this case, funding and market illiquidity coincide and
reinforce each other. Sudden withdrawals of short-term debt are always accompanied by
market liquidity dry-ups due to adverse selection frictions caused by firms’ information
acquisition. Low market prices reduce the residual value of firms’ assets, which leads low
return firms to default on their outstanding debt in t = 2. In this case, market liquidity
risk also increases creditors’ incentives to withdraw as outstanding creditors in t = 2 are
no longer guaranteed to receive the full face value of their claims even if θ > η∗. As a
result, creditors prefer to withdraw their debt in more states than those justified by their
idiosyncratic balance sheet shocks (η∗ ≥ η∗). Thus, in the strong dependence case, the
coordination failure among firms “spills over” and generates a coordination failure among
creditors, thereby amplifying funding liquidity risk (see Figure 5).
26














3.4 Strong versus Weak Dependence
Whether the weak or the strong dependence regime obtains depends on the characteristics
of the economy, such as firms’ debt maturity structure, the cost of outside liquidity or the







S(σ, 1)dσ > η̂ − (D2 −D1)
Given equation (7), this condition is easier to satisfy if the share of short-term debt α is
high and the cost of liquidity lines β−1 is low. This suggests that an economy is more
susceptible to be in the strong dependence regime when the fraction of short-term debt is
relatively high, and when issuing banks can access outside liquidity at low costs.27 Higher
asset risk also increases the surplus from information acquisition and, consequently, the
susceptibility to be in the strong dependence regime.28
27The result pertaining to firms’ debt maturity structure suggests that financial fragility caused by
excessive reliance on short-term financing - e.g. Stein (2012), Brunnermeier & Oehmke (2013) or König &
Pothier (2016) - can be amplified by information-induced market illiquidity.
28We measure asset risk as a mean preserving spread of assets’ random return R̃. Formally, this corre-
sponds to a reduction in ρ while keeping E0[R̃] unchanged.
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3.5 Welfare
Efficient Thresholds. When defining the relevant welfare benchmark, we restrict at-
tention to allocations that maximize aggregate utility from consumption subject to the
exogenous debt contract (D1, D2).
29 The problem faced by the social planner consists of
choosing thresholds (ψsp, ηsp) ∈ R2+ that maximize the sum of firms’ value and creditors’
utility given some realized state θ.
Definition 1. Given thresholds ψsp and ηsp, and associated values σ(θ, ψsp) and λ(θ, ηsp),
aggregate utility from consumption given the debt contract (D1, D2) is
W(σ, λ; θ) = E0[V (Ωj)]− σψ(θ) + U(λD1, (1− λ)D2; η(θ))
Using firms’ value functions (3) and (4), and creditors’ utility function (1), we can
rewrite the social welfare function as follows










− σψ(θ) + αλ(η∗ − η(θ))
Even without taking into account the opportunity cost of information acquisition, social
welfare when σ > 0 is always strictly less than when σ = 0. This is because information
acquisition leads firms with good assets to pay back withdrawing early creditors using
their liquidity lines rather than selling assets. Consequently, not all gains from trade are
realized as these liquidity lines require firms to forego β−1 units of consumption per unit
of liquidity. Information acquisition is thus unambiguously inefficient in this economy.
Proposition 5. Given the debt contract (D1, D2), the Pareto efficient thresholds are such
that ψsp = 0 and ηsp = η
∗.
In the absence of market liquidity risk, it is optimal to allow short-term creditors to
withdraw their funds when their valuation for t = 1 consumption exceeds the interest
29Relaxing this assumption would allow the social planner to increase welfare by redistributing resources
across creditors and firms in some states. Since the focus of our paper is not to characterize the optimal
contract between firms and creditors, we require the planner to use this exogenous debt contract even
though it is generically inefficient.
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foregone from withdrawing early. These early withdrawals do not reduce the expected
value of firms when ψSP = 0 since the absence of information acquisition allows them to
sell assets without incurring a liquidity discount.
Inefficiency of the Market Equilibrium. The nature of the inefficiencies afflicting
the market allocation depends on whether a regime of weak or strong dependence obtains.
In both regimes, the information acquisition threshold is inefficiently high. This ineffi-
ciency results from the collapse in market liquidity when firms acquire information. The
externality distorting firms’ incentives operates through changes in the market price. In
particular, individual firms that acquire information and withhold good assets from the
market do not internalize how their behavior affects other firms’ option value from holding
on to good assets. While firms’ value would be unambiguously greater if they refrained
from acquiring information, in equilibrium information acquisition is always privately op-
timal for sufficiently small realizations of θ.
Contrary to firms’ information acquisition behavior, creditors’ decisions need not be
inefficient. In the weak dependence regime, they coordinate on the efficient threshold
and only withdraw if their net outflows exceed the foregone interest implied by the debt
contract. The inefficient information acquisition decisions of firms, and the associated
market liquidity risk, do not distort creditors’ incentives in this case. This is no longer true
in the strong dependence regime, as both firms’ and creditors’ thresholds are inefficiently
high. This arises because market liquidity risk induces a coordination failure among short-
term creditors which leads to excessive withdrawals. This coordination failure operates
through creditors’ loss-given-default. More specifically, individual creditors that refuse to
roll over their funds do not internalize how their withdrawal decision affects the residual
value of firms’ assets. This leads creditors to withdraw in more states than those justified
by their idiosyncratic balance sheet shocks.
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4 Policy Implications
4.1 Policy Measures: In Practice
Beginning in August 2007, the US Federal Reserve (Fed) adopted a number of policy
measures to shore up wholesale funding markets including the ABCP market. At first,
“conventional” liquidity injections were implemented via a lowering of central bank dis-
count rates and short-term repurchase transactions.30 These liquidity injections, however,
failed to stop the precipitous fall in outstanding ABCP. They also did not prevent the run
on money market funds that followed the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers.
In response to the run, the US Treasury announced that it would temporarily guarantee
all assets held by money market funds. While this succeeded in stopping the run, it failed to
prop up the further collapsing ABCP market. This led the Fed to provide large amounts of
non-recourse loans to commercial banks in order for them to purchase ABCP from money
market funds. A few weeks later, the Fed also began purchasing commercial paper directly
from issuers.31 These policy measures specifically targeting the ABCP market were also
accompanied by outright purchases of asset-backed securities.32
Our model allows to evaluate the efficacy of different policy measures aimed at mini-
mizing the risk of market and funding liquidity dry-ups. Largely inspired by the measures
adopted by the Federal Reserve summarized above, we focus attention on four specific
types of policies: (i) public guarantees that protect creditors from default risk, (ii) asset
purchase programs that place a floor on the price at which assets trade, (iii) liquidity
injections that reduce the cost of private liquidity lines, and (iv) outright purchases of
debt securities. Below, we compare the effects of each of these measures in turn.
30In the euro area, the ECB injected EUR 95 billion into overnight lending markets on August 9, 2007.
Over the following few days, the Fed followed suit and injected $62 billion. On September 18, 2007 the Fed
supplemented these measures by launching the Term Auction Facility (TAF) which conducted longer-term
repurchase transactions totaling $100 billion (Kacperczyk & Schnabl, 2010).
31The non-recourse loans were administered by the Boston Fed’s liquidity facility (AMLF) and pur-
chased roughly $150 billion worth of commercial paper in its first two week of activity. Outright debt
purchases were carried out by the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) which purchased over $300
billion worth of commercial paper. Through these two facilities, the Fed ended up holding about 25% of
outstanding commercial paper by the end of 2008 (Kacperczyk & Schnabl, 2010).
32The Fed extended non-recourse loans to buyers of both newly issued ABSs and legacy mortgage-backed
securities through its Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan facility (TALF) (Ashcraft et al., 2012).
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4.2 Policy Measures: In Theory
Creditor Guarantees versus Asset Purchases. We begin by assessing the relative
efficacy of creditor guarantees and asset purchase programs in minimizing firms’ default
risk. While default in our model is not inefficient per se, one may imagine it to be
associated with potentially very large dead-weight social costs. Given these (unmodeled)
costs, a government may be willing to expend resources in order to protect creditors from
default risk.
Consider first the effect of public guarantees that cover any loss incurred by creditors
in case firms are unable to repay the full face value of debt in t = 2. In the context of the
model, this can be thought of as a commitment to make a transfer to creditors in case of
default, thereby setting creditors’ loss-given-default X = 0. Such a policy clearly breaks
the strategic complementarities in creditors’ withdrawal decisions, since their payoff no
longer depends on the fraction of early withdrawals. While this policy also reduces the
likelihood of market liquidity dry-ups in the strong dependence regime, it has no effect
on market liquidity risk in the weak dependence regime. Since these public guarantees do
not eliminate the risk of market liquidity dry-ups, the government may have to expend
resources under this scheme. In particular, by failing to eliminate firms’ incentives to
acquire information, the government is forced to transfer resources to creditors whenever
θ < min{ψ∗, η∗}.
Corollary 1. Guarantees that protect creditors from default risk eliminate the risk of
excessive withdrawals (i.e. η∗ε = η





Next, consider the effect of a government commitment to purchase assets at a reserva-
tion price q > Rl. By placing a floor on asset prices, this policy reduces firms’ incentives
to acquire information by lowering the option value from withholding good assets from
the market. Moreover, it also reduces creditors’ incentives to withdraw early by lowering
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their loss-given-default. If the government sets q > D1, it prevents firms from defaulting
and eliminates the coordination failure among creditors (i.e. η∗ε = η
∗). Similarly to the
creditor guarantees, asset purchases require the government to make a loss in some states.
Even though the floor on asset prices reduces firms incentives to acquire information, it
does not fully eliminate market liquidity risk since firms find it strictly dominant to acquire
information for sufficiently small values of θ.33 Thus, any price guarantee q > Rl requires
the government to buy bad assets at a price above their fundamental value in some states.
Corollary 2. Asset price guarantees that bound prices above D1 eliminate the risk of
excessive withdrawals (i.e. η∗ε = η
∗). The expected cost from purchasing assets at price




α(1− π)(D1 −Rl)dθ ≤ CCG
Corollaries 1 and 2 imply that asset purchases are more cost-effective than creditor
guarantees in eliminating creditors’ loss-given-default. This is because asset purchases
directly lower firms’ surplus from acquiring information by reducing the cost from using
the secondary market to obtain liquidity. As a result, asset price guarantees succeed in
lowering market liquidity risk in both weak and strong dependence regimes.
Liquidity Injections versus Outright Debt Purchases. We now assess the relative
efficacy of liquidity injections and outright purchases of debt securities in boosting both
market and funding liquidity, and not just protecting creditors from default (as above).
We first consider the effect of liquidity injections, e.g. lowering interest rates, that
reduce the cost of firms’ liquidity lines (β−1). Maintaining the bounds on β implied by
Assumption 2, such a policy unambiguously increases the likelihood of market liquidity
dry-ups. The reason for this seemingly paradoxical result is that, by lowering the cost of
33Formally, given some reservation price q ∈ [D1,E0[R̃]], firms acquire information for all θ such that













liquidity lines, liquidity injections increase the value of holding on to good assets rather
than selling them. This amplifies the adverse selection problem in the secondary market
and exacerbates the coordination failure among firms. Moreover, if the economy finds itself
in the strong dependence regime, such liquidity injections further amplify the coordination
failure among creditors and thus also increase funding liquidity risk.
Corollary 3. Liquidity injections that lower the cost of liquidity lines (strictly) increase
market liquidity risk and (weakly) increase funding liquidity risk: dψ
∗
ε
dβ > 0 and
dη∗ε
dβ ≥ 0.
Finally, we consider the effect of outright purchases of debt securities, such as those
conducted by the Federal Reserve using the AMLF and CPFF. In the context of the
model, this can be thought of as lowering the fraction of short-term debt. By committing
to purchase short-term debt securities in case creditors are unwilling to roll-over, the
government effectively protects firms from funding liquidity risk. In so doing, it lowers
firms’ incentives to acquire information. By raising market liquidity, debt purchases also
reduce creditors’ incentives to withdraw early.
Corollary 4. Debt purchases that lower the fraction of short-term debt (strictly) decrease
market liquidity risk and (weakly) decrease funding liquidity risk: dψ
∗
ε
dα > 0 and
dη∗ε
dα ≥ 0.
Completely eliminating funding liquidity risk (α = 0) implements the efficient allocation.
If its purchases are unbounded (so that setting α = 0 is feasible), the government can
completely eliminate market liquidity risk and ensure that no firm acquires information
in equilibrium. Such debt purchases can therefore be used to implement the efficient
allocation described above. Moreover, if claims held by the government benefit from the
same credit guarantees as those held by private agents, such a policy never requires the
government to incur a loss. While the government has to step in and absorb all outstanding
short-term debt on its balance sheet in t = 1 if θ < η∗, it is always paid back in full in
t = 2 when assets mature.
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5 Conclusion
This paper presents a model of liquidity dry-ups based on a novel feedback mechanism
between market and funding liquidity. Financial firms hold assets of initially unknown
quality, financed by short- and long-term wholesale debt. Early withdrawals increase firms’
incentives to acquire information about their assets. When learning that their assets are
good, firms prefer to cover withdrawals by using outside liquidity lines and withhold their
assets from the market. A classic adverse selection problem emerges leading assets to trade
at a “lemons discount”. Moreover, if prices fall by enough, creditors that roll-over their
short-term debt may no longer receive the full face value of their claims. This can spark
further withdrawals and produces an amplification between funding and market liquidity
dry-ups. Two distinct regimes emerge which differ in terms of the feedback between market
and funding liquidity.
We also study different policy interventions that can mitigate the risk of inefficient
liquidity dry-ups. First, we find that asset purchases are a more cost-effective measure
than public debt guarantees if the policy maker seeks to minimize creditors’ loss in case
of default. Second, outright debt purchases can implement the efficient allocation and
boost both market and funding liquidity. Third, liquidity injections that lower the cost
of outside liquidity lines can backfire as they exacerbate the adverse selection problem
causing market liquidity to dry-up.
While the firms in our model resemble shadow banking arrangements that were preva-
lent prior to the 2007-08 financial crisis, the model is not necessarily confined to such
financial structures. One may interpret our firms more broadly as financial institutions
funded by collateralized debt. In this case, the credit enhancements may represent addi-
tional non-marketable assets on firms’ balance sheets that can be transferred to creditors
in case of default. Similarly, the outside liquidity lines may be interpreted as the interbank
market or the central bank’s discount window. From this perspective, our model highlights
the fragility of financial institutions that hold complex and opaque securities financed by




Proof of Lemma 1. Notice that





− (1− αλ)D2 ⇔ βE[R̃|Ωj ] ≷ p
From Assumption 2, it follows that for all p ∈ [Rl,E0[R̃]], good firms prefer the liquidity line while bad
firms and uninformed firms prefer asset sales for p ≥ D1. For p < D1, the expected repayment in t = 2 for
good firms is unchanged since E[˜̀|h] = D2, and they still prefer to use the liquidity line for p < D1. Since
E[˜̀|Ωj ] < D2 for all Ωj ∈ {n, b}, bad firms and uninformed firms also prefer asset sales for p < D1.
Proof of Proposition 3. We first show that there exists a unique montone equilibrium where thresholds are
such that ψ∗ε ≤ η∗ε . Second, we show that there are no equilibria in non-monotone strategies.
1. Unique Monotone Equilibrium





1 if ψ∗ε ≤ η∗ε − 2ε(1− σD)
[0, 1) if ψ∗ε > η
∗
ε − 2ε(1− σD)



























≡ η∗ − 2ε(1 − σD). For a given ψ∗ε , the optimal withdraw threshold is therefore η∗ε = η∗ if
















< 1, ∀σ ∈ (0, 1) and ψ∗ε > ψDε
where the condition follows from application of the implicit function theorem, Lemma 6 which implies that
Xσ(·) > 0 and the fact that X(λD, σD) = 0. Since the slope of the threshold function is less than unity,
we must have η∗ε (ψ
∗
ε ) < ψ
∗
ε + 2ε(1 − σD) for all ψDε > ψDε , so that condition (A1) uniquely determines
creditors’ optimal threshold as a function of ψ∗ε .
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S (σ, 1) dσ ≡ ψ∗
since F (·) ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, by application of the intermediate value theorem, the function G(ψ∗ε ) must
intersect ψ∗ε at least once for values of ψ
∗

















dσ < 0, ∀λ ∈ (0, 1)
implying that there exists a unique value of ψ∗ε ∈ (0, ψ
∗
] that solves ψ∗ε = G(ψ
∗
ε ).
Finally, we show that ψ∗ε < η
∗











< 1, ∀λ ∈ (0, 1)
where the condition follows from Lemma 4 since Sλ(·) > 0. Since ψ∗ = 0, the unique fixed point must be
such that ψ∗ < η∗.
2. No Equilibria in Non-Monotone Strategies
Next, we establish that no equilibria in non-monotone strategies exist by using an argument similar to
Goldstein (2005). Towards a contradiction, suppose that an alternative non-monotone equilibrium exists
where firms acquire information for some ψj > ψ
∗
ε and where creditors withdraw for some ηi > η
∗
ε . Due
to the existence of dominance regions, there exists a value ψN such that firms never acquire information
for ψj > ψN . Similarly, there exists a value ηN such that creditors always roll over for ηj > ηN . Let σN
denote the fraction of firms who acquire information in this non-monotone equilibrium and denote by λN
the fraction of creditors who withdraw their funds. These fractions satisfy

















S(σN (θ), λN (θ))dθ = 0
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Comparing this with equation (11) in the text implies the following inequality





















Since ψN − ψ∗ε > 0, the latter only holds if
ηN − ψN > η∗ε − ψ∗ε (A2)
Repeating this line of reasoning for the expected surplus from withdrawing versus rolling over implies





























. Since ηN > η
∗
ε and Xσ > 0, this inequality only holds if
ψN − ηN > ψ∗ε − η∗ε (A3)
As inequality (A3) contradicts inequality (A2), a non-monotone equilibrium cannot exist.
Proof of Proposition 4. The structure of the proof follows that of Proposition 2 in Goldstein (2005). We
first show that ψ∗ε → ψ
∗
and η∗ε → η∗ if and only if ψ
∗
< η∗. We prove that this condition is sufficient by
construction. From condition (11), if ψ∗ε < η
∗





ε ) = ψ
∗





ε ) = η
∗
where the limit follows from the fact that limε→0 λ




ε as ε → 0. To prove necessity,




We next show that ψ∗ε → η∗ε if and only if ψ
∗ ≥ η∗. We proceed to prove that the claim is sufficient
by contradiction. From above, we know that ψ∗ε ≮ η∗ε if ψ
∗ ≥ η∗. Next, assume that ψ∗ε > η∗ε as ε → 0.
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ε ) = ψ
∗ = 0





ε ) = η
∗ > 0
where the limit follows from the fact that limε→0 λ




ε as ε→ 0. But then we must have
ψ∗ε < η
∗
ε , a contradiction. Hence, if ψ
∗ ≥ η∗, it must be that ψ∗ε → η∗ε as ε→ 0.
Finally, we show that η∗ε → η∗ ∈ [η∗, ψ
∗





















where the inequality follows from limε→0 λ




















(S(σ, 1) = ψ
∗










∈ [0, 1] as ε→ 0 and Lemma 4. Since ψ∗ε → η∗ε
as ε → 0, it follows that η∗ε → η∗ ∈ [η∗, ψ
∗
]. Clearly, this interval is empty if ψ
∗
< η∗. This proves that
the condition is also necessary.
Proof of Proposition 5. Given some value σ ∈ [0, 1], the expected value of firms (net of the information
acquisition costs) is given by
E0[V (Ωj)] = σ(πV
LL(h;β) + (1− π)V AS(b; p)) + (1− σ)V AS(n; p)
Similarly, given some value λ ∈ [0, 1], creditors’ aggregate utility is given by











Summing these two equations and simplifying yields





((1− σ)πRh + (1− π)Rl) + αλ(D1 + η̂ − η(θ)− (D2 −D1))
Substituting for p(σ) and rearranging yields














Obviously, Wσ(σ, λ; θ) < 0 for all λ ∈ [0, 1]. Given the definition of σ(θ), it follows that ψsp = ψ∗ = 0 and
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σ(θ) = 0 for all θ. Differentiating the welfare function with respect to λ, we obtain
Wλ(σ, λ; θ) = α
(












≷ 0 ⇔ η∗ ≷ η(θ)
Given the definition of λ(θ), it follows immediately that we must have ηsp = η
∗.
Proof of Corollaries 1-4. The equilibrium thresholds solve the following system of equations
A(ψ∗ε , η
∗











dσ = 0 (A4)
B(ψ∗ε , η
∗











dλ = 0 (A5)
1. Creditor Guarantees. If the government guarantees to cover creditors’ loss given default (X), the
condition determining creditors’ equilibrium threshold (A5) becomes
BCG(ψ∗ε , η
∗
ε ) ≡ η∗ε − η∗ = 0⇒ η∗ε = η∗ (A6)
Consequently, the condition determining firms’ equilibrium threshold (A4) simplifies to
ACG(ψ∗ε , η
























It follows that creditor guarantees eliminate the risk of excessive withdrawals, reduce market liquidity risk
in the strong dependence regime, but have no effect on market liquidity risk in the weak dependence regime.
Since this policy does not eliminate market liquidity risk, firms still default in equilibrium for values of











2. Asset Purchase Programs. Given an asset price guarantee q ≥ D1, we must have λD(ψ∗ε ) = 1 for all ψ∗ε
since max{q, p(σ)} ≥ D1. It follows that the condition determining creditors’ equilibrium threshold is the
same as under the creditor guarantee discussed above and given condition by (A6). Using the definition
of firms’ surplus function, S(σ;λ), firms’ equilibrium threshold in this case solves
AAP(ψ∗ε , η










































since q > Rl. It follows that asset price guarantees strictly decrease market liquidity
risk in both weak and strong dependence regimes. However, firms still acquire information for values of
θ < min{ψ∗q , η∗}, implying that the government will be forced to purchase bad assets at an inflated price






















3. Liquidity Injections. The Jacobian of the system of equations (A4)-(A5) is given by
J =





















and its determinant is equal to










where the inequality follows from Lemmas 4 and 6. Application of the implicit function theorem implies
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Sβ(σ, ·)dσ < 0 by the definition of S(σ, λ) and ∂B∂β = 0 by the definition of X(λ, σ). By




































max{0,λD} Xσ(λ, ·)dλ 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ 0
where the sign of the inequality depends on whether λD ≤ 1.
4. Outright Debt Purchases. We consider outright debt purchases that reduce the fraction of short-term












Xα(λ; ·)dλ ≤ 0







so that market liquidity and funding liquidity risk are both increasing in the fraction of short-term debt.





A2 Robustness and Extensions
No Credit Enhancements
Without the credit enhancements, firms default whenever the per capita value of their assets falls below D2.
We show below that while the absence of credit enhancements does not affect firms’ information acquisition
incentives, it breaks the strategic complementarities in creditors’ withdrawal decisions when p > D1. As
in the main text, we restrict attention to environments where good firms never default. Assumption 1 now
becomes
Assumption A1. The fraction of short-term debt is be such that
α ≤ Rl − ρD2
D1 − ρD2
The absence of credit enhancements implies that firms holding bad assets may default even if they use
their liquidity line to meet early withdrawals. The value of outstanding debt claims in t = 2 for bad firms
using their liquidity lines and selling assets, respectively, are given by














It follows that default of firms using their liquidity lines implies default of firms using asset sales, but not
vice versa. Notwithstanding these different default conditions, the absence of credit enhancements does
not qualitatively change firms’ preference ordering, so that Lemma 1 still holds.
Lemma A1. Given Assumptions A1 and 2, informed good firms always prefer the liquidity line, while
informed bad firms and uninformed firms always prefer asset sales in the absence of credit enhancements.
Proof. Since good firms never default, the proof that informed firms holding good assets always prefer the
liquidity line is the same as in the proof of Lemma 1. Similarly, in cases where bad firms selling assets
default but those using their liquidity lines do not, the proof that informed bad firms and uninformed firms
prefer asset sales is the same as in the proof of Lemma 1. It therefore remains to show that both prefer
asset sales if bad firms using their liquidity line also default. In this case, the payoff difference between
asset sales and the liquidity line for all Ωj ∈ {n, l} is given by







− (1− αλ)(E[˜̀CL|Ωj ]−E[˜̀AS |Ωj ]) < 0
where the inequality follows from Assumption 2 and (E[˜̀CL|Ωj ]−E[˜̀AS |Ωj ]) ≥ 0 for all Ωj ∈ {n, l}.
The absence of credit enhancements thus has no effect on the secondary market price and Lemma 2
still holds. Also, firms’ surplus from acquiring information is unchanged and still given by condition (7).
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The absence of credit enhancements does, however, change creditors’ expected surplus from withdrawing
























if p(σ) < D1
Without credit enhancements, firms holding bad assets may default even if p ≥ D1. This additional
default risk arises because a low fraction of early withdrawals increases the face value of firms’ liabilities
since D2 > D1. Consequently, even if secondary market prices are high, firms default in t = 2 if too
few creditors opt to withdraw their funds in t = 1. This additional source of default risk leads creditors’
withdraw decisions to become strategic substitutes when prices are high. To see this formally, notice that




(1−αλ)2p(σ) < 0 if λ < λ̂(σ)
0 if λ ≥ λ̂(σ)
, where λ̂(σ) =
D2 −Rl
D2 − D1p(σ)Rl
Even though global strategic complementarities in creditors’ withdrawal decisions no longer obtain in this
case, the counteracting effect described above never arises for sufficiently low secondary market prices. In





then creditors’ surplus from withdrawing early is strictly increasing in the fraction of early withdrawals.
Default of Good Firms
Relax Assumption 1 and set α = 1 so that firms’ assets are entirely financed by short-term debt that can be
withdrawn in t = 1.34 Then, there exists a threshold λ such that good firms default on their outstanding
claims in t = 2 if λ > λ and p < D1. Moreover, there exists a second threshold λ > λ such that firms
cannot fully meet early withdrawals by selling assets and default in t = 1 if λ > λ. In this case, the value
of firms using asset sales is given by













− (1− λ)E[˜̀(p)|Ωj ] if p ∈ (λD1, D1)
−(λD1 − p)− (1− λ)(D2 −Rl) if p ≤ λD1
34Setting α = 1 is without loss of generality, and serves only to simply notation. The results presented
below immediately carry through for all values of α > α.
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The value of firms using liquidity lines is unchanged, and still given by condition (4). Relaxing Assumption
1 does not qualitatively change firms’ preference ordering between liquidity lines and asset sales, implying
that Lemma 1 still holds.
Lemma A2. Given Assumption 2, informed good firms always prefer the liquidity line, while informed
bad firms and uninformed firms always prefer asset sales when α = 1.
Proof. As in the proof of Lemma 1, notice that the definition of `i for all i ∈ {h, l} implies D2 ≥ E[˜̀|Ωj ].
Thus, bad firms and uninformed firms prefer asset sales for p ∈ (λD1, D1). We also have that
V LL(Ωj ;β) ≷ −(λD1 − p)− (1− λ)(D2 −Rl) ⇔ βE[R̃|Ωj ] ≷ βp+ (1− β)λD1 + β(1− λ)Rl
Since βp+ (1− β)λD1 > p and (1− λ)βRl > 0, it follows that bad and uninformed firms must still prefer




(βRh − (λD1 + (1− λ)βD2)) > 0
where the inequality follows from the fact that λD1 + (1− λ)βD2 < E0[R̃]. Hence, good firms prefer the
liquidity line for p ≤ λD1 as the payoff from asset sales is always negative in this case. It remains to show
that good firms prefer the liquidity line when p ∈ (λD1, D1) and `h < D2 (since otherwise the payoff from
asset sales is the same as when p ≥ D1). Given Assumption 2, the payoff difference between the liquidity
line and asset sales in this case satisfies
V LL(h;β)− V AS(h;β) = 1
β
(βRh − (λD1 + (1− λ)βRl)) > 0
Again, where the inequality follows from the fact that λD1 + (1− λ)βRl < E0[R̃].
Hence, relaxing Assumption 1 has no effect on the secondary market price and Lemma 2 still holds.
Given the change in the value of firms from selling assets, the surplus from acquiring information, previously


















πRh − (1− λ)πRl if σ ≥ σ(λ)
where
σ(λ) : p(σ(λ)) =
λD1
1− (1− λ)ρ and σ(λ) : p(σ(λ)) = λD1
Proposition A1. For α = 1, firms’ surplus from acquiring information is weakly increasing in the fraction
of informed firms: i.e. Sσ(σ;λ) ≥ 0.
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It follows that strategic complementarities in information acquisition still obtain if we allow firms with
good assets to default. Hence, self-fulfilling market liquidity dry-ups can still obtain even after relaxing
Assumption 1.
Similarly, we show that creditors’ withdrawal incentives are qualitatively unchanged if we allow firms






































(1− σπ)Rl if λ ≥ λ(σ)
where







Creditors’ withdraw decisions thus remain strategic complements for values of σ such that p(σ) < D1.
Proposition A2. For α = 1, creditors’ surplus from withdrawing funds early is weakly increasing in the
fraction of withdrawals: i.e. Wλ(λ;σ) ≥ 0.
Different Preference Ordering
Assumption 2 in the main text served to fix firms’ preferences between using their liquidity lines and selling
assets in order to meet early withdrawals. Relaxing the lower bound on ρ implies that there exists a critical
price below which uninformed firms prefer using their liquidity lines rather than continuing to sell assets in
the secondary market. In other words, Lemma 1 no longer holds. In order for uninformed firms to prefer
selling assets rather than tapping their liquidity lines, we must have







+ (1− αλ)(D2 − `l(p)) > 0
In what follows, we focus on the case where βE0[R̃] > D1 (so that `l = D2 when p(σ) = βE0[R̃]).
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Uninformed agents thus switch between asset sales to tapping their liquidity lines whenever
p(σ) < βE0[R̃]⇒ σ > σ̃ ≡
π − Γ
π(1− Γ) , where Γ ≡
πβ(1−ρ)−(1−β)ρ
1−ρ < π




1−πσ if σ ≤ σ̃
0 if σ > σ̃
35This is done to simplify the exposition. Similar arguments hold for values of βE0[R̃] ∈ [Rl, D1].
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Lemma A3. If βE0[R̃] > D1, then there exists a threshold value σ̃ ∈ (0, 1) such that uninformed firms
prefer meeting early withdrawals using asset sales if and only if σ ≤ σ̃.
The fact that uninformed agents drop out of the secondary market for sufficiently high values of σ


















(1− π)Rl if σ > σ̃
(A7)
When the share of informed firms exceeds σ̃, uninformed firms no longer trade in the secondary market
and the price collapses to Rl. Although the option value from withholding good assets disappears (since
both informed firms with good assets and uninformed firms prefer using their liquidity lines), the expected
surplus from acquiring information is still positive. This arises because information acquisition allows firms
with bad assets to sell these (at their fundamental price Rl) rather than using their costly liquidity lines
to pay back early creditors.
It is straightforward to show that firms’ surplus from information acquisition is no longer increasing
in σ in this case since the gains from trading only bad assets are always strictly less than the option
value that otherwise accrues to informed firms. This leads the surplus function S(σ;λ) to jump down
discontinuously at σ̃ when uninformed firms exit the market (see Figure A1). This discontinuity in firms’
payoff functions implies that an equilibrium in the information acquisition game is no longer guaranteed
to exist. In particular, an equilibrium may fail to exist for low values of ψ if the gains from trading only
bad assets is sufficiently low. Barring this technical detail, however, self-fulfilling market liquidity dry-ups
are still feasible even under this alternate preference ordering.
Proposition A3. Self-fulfilling (market) liquidity dry-ups can still obtain in equilibrium if βE0[R̃] > D1.
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Proof. We begin by showing that the surplus function jumps down discontinuously at σ = σ̃.
Claim A1. The surplus function (A7) is such that S(σ̃;λ) > limσ→σ̃− S(σ;λ).







































where the inequality follows directly from the assumption that βE0[R̃] > D1.
We next show that the discontinuity of the surplus function S(σ;λ) at σ̃ implies that an equilibrium
need not always exist.
Claim A2. An equilibrium may fail to exist in the information acquisition game if βE0[R̃] > D1.
Proof. Note that the discontinuity of the surplus function at σ̃ implies that firms’ best response correspon-
dence σ∗j (σ) does not have a closed graph. Consequently, Kakutani’s fixed point theorem does not apply








In this case, we have S(1) < S(0) since Sσ(σ;λ) = 0 for all σ > σ̃. Hence, firms’ best response correspon-
dence in pure strategies σ∗j (σ) : {0, 1} → {0, 1} can be weakly decreasing in σ, implying that Tarski’s fixed
point theorem does not apply and a pure strategy equilibrium need not exist either.
We proceed to prove the claim by construction. Assume that condition (A8) holds and consider values
of ψ ∈ [S(1), S(0)]. Then S(0) − ψ > 0 and σ∗j (0) = 1, implying that firms’ best response to no firm
acquiring information is to acquire information. Similarly, S(1) − ψ < 0 and σ∗j (1) = 0, implying that
firms’ best response to all firms acquiring information is to not acquire information. Hence, for these values
of ψ no pure strategy equilibria exist. To see that no equilibrium exists in mixed strategies either, notice
that Sσ(σ;λ) > 0 for all σ ≤ σ̃. Hence, we also have S(σ;λ) > ψ for all values of σ ≤ σ̃.
Notwithstanding this potential non-existence problem, multiple equilibria can also arise in this case.




If firms are able to split their asset sales, then investors can no longer infer assets’ quality based on the
quantity firms supply to the market. In this case, since p ≥ Rl, informed firms with bad assets will always
find it optimal to sell all their assets on the secondary market. The share of good assets supplied to the







with τσ(σ, p) < 0 and τp(σ, p) < 0. The secondary market price is now implicitly defined by the following
condition
F(p, σ) ≡ p− (Rl + τ(σ, p)(Rh −Rl)) = 0 (A9)
Allowing for unobservable trades does not qualitatively change the properties of the price function: i.e.
the secondary market price is still decreasing in the fraction of informed firms so that Lemma 2 still holds.
Lemma A4. If trades are unobservable, there exists a unique secondary market price p(σ) and p′(σ) < 0.
Proof. To prove the uniqueness of the secondary market price, note first that
F(σ,Rl) = −τ(σ,Rl)(Rh −Rl) ≤ 0
F(σ,E0[R̃]) = (π − τ(σ,E0[R̃])(Rh −Rl)) ≥ 0
Since τp(σ, p) < 0, we also have that
Fp(σ, p) = 1− τp(σ, p)(Rh −Rl) > 0
It follows that, for any value of σ ∈ [0, 1], there exists a unique value of p ∈ [Rl,E0[R̃]] that satisfies
condition (A9). Application of the implicit function theorem yields
p′(σ) = −Fσ(σ, p)Fp(σ, p)
< 0
where the inequality follows from Fσ(σ, p) = −τσ(σ, p)(Rh −Rl) > 0 since τσ(σ, p) < 0.
Allowing for unobservable trades does not change firms’ value from using liquidity lines, but it does
change the value from using asset sales for informed firms with bad assets. In particular, condition (3)
now becomes
V AS(l, p) = p− αλD1 − (1− αλ)E[˜̀(p)|l]
where




1− αλ , 0
}
48

































πRh if σ ≥ σ̂
where
σD : p(σD) = D1 and σ̂ : p(σ̂) = αλD1 + (1− αλ)Rl
Assuming that trades are unobservable therefore introduces an additional term in firms’ surplus function.
This additional term corresponds to the information rent informed firms with bad assets enjoy from
offloading these at the the pooling price in the secondary market. A distinctive feature of this information
rent is that it is increasing in the secondary market price, and therefore decreasing in σ. This effect weakens
the strategic complementarities in information acquisition that result from the option value of withholding
good assets (the channel studied in the main text). To see this formally, notice that the derivative of the
















≷ 0 if σ ∈ (σD, σ̂)
−p′(σ)αλD1πRh
p2(σ)
> 0 if σ ≥ σ̂
Notwithstanding the fact that the information rent effect may break the global strategic complementarities
in firms’ information acquisition decisions, it is straightforward to show that this information rent effect
is always dominated by the option value motive if the fraction of early withdraws is sufficiently high. In
particular, if trades are unobservable and the fraction of early withdrawals is such that








then firms’ surplus from acquiring information is strictly increasing in the fraction of informed firms.
The information rent derived above (in the absence of default) corresponds to the private value of infor-
mation acquisition studied by (Gorton & Ordonez, 2014). Contrary to the option value from withholding
good assets studied in our paper, it cannot in itself explain self-fulfilling dry-ups in market liquidity. In
particular, increases in the fraction of informed firms lower secondary market prices due to adverse selec-
tion, but this fall in the price leads to a reduction in firms’ incentives to acquire information as it reduces
the information rents obtained from selling bad assets.
49
Bibliography
Acharya, V., Almeida, H., & Campello, M. (2013a). Aggregate risk and the choice between
cash and lines of credit. The Journal of Finance, 68(5), 2059–2116.
Acharya, V. V., Schnabl, P., & Suarez, G. (2013b). Securitization without risk transfer.
Journal of Financial Economics, 107(3), 515–536.
Akerlof, G. A. (1970). The market for lemons: Quality uncertainty and the market mech-
anism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, (pp. 488–500).
Ashcraft, A., Malz, A., & Pozsar, Z. (2012). The Federal Reserve’s Term Asset-Backed
Security Loan Facility. Frbny economic policy review, Federal Reserve Bank of New
York.
Bolton, P., Santos, T., & Scheinkman, J. A. (2015). Cream skimming in financial markets.
Working Paper.
Brunnermeier, M. K. & Oehmke, M. (2013). The maturity rat race. The Journal of
Finance, 68(2), 483–521.
Brunnermeier, M. K. & Pedersen, L. H. (2009). Market liquidity and funding liquidity.
Review of Financial studies, 22(6), 2201–2238.
Carlsson, H. & van Damme, E. (1993). Global Games and Equilibrium Selection. Econo-
metrica, 61(5), 989–1018.
Covitz, D., Liang, N., & Suarez, G. (2013). The Evolution of a Financial Crisis: Collapse
of the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Market. Journal of Finance, 68(3), 815–848.
Dang, T. V., Gorton, G., & Holmström, B. (2013). The information sensitivity of a
security. Working Paper.
Dang, T. V., Gorton, G., & Holmström, B. (2015). Ignorance, debt, and financial crises.
Working Paper.
50
Diamond, D. W. & Dybvig, P. H. (1983). Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity. The
Journal of Political Economy, (pp. 401–419).
Eisenbach, T. M. (2013). Rollover risk as market discipline: a two-sided inefficiency. Staff
Reports 597, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Eisfeldt, A. L. (2004). Endogenous liquidity in asset markets. The Journal of Finance,
59(1), 1–30.
Feijer, D. (2015). Information panics and liquidity crises. mimeo.
Fishman, M. & Parker, J. (2015). Valuation, adverse selection, and market collapses.
Review of Financial Studies.
Goldstein, I. (2005). Strategic complementarities and the twin crises. Economic Journal,
115(503), 368–390.
Goldstein, I. & Pauzner, A. (2005). Demand deposit contracts and the probability of bank
runs. Journal of Finance, 60(3), 1293–1328.
Gorton, G. (2010). Slapped by the invisible hand: The panic of 2007. Oxford University
Press.
Gorton, G. & Ordonez, G. (2014). Collateral crises. The American Economic Review,
104(2), 343–378.
Gorton, G. & Pennacchi, G. (1990). Financial intermediaries and liquidity creation. The
Journal of Finance, (pp. 49–71).
Gorton, G. B. (2012). Some Reflections on the Recent Financial Crisis. Technical report,
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Hirshleifer, J. (1971). The private and social value of information and the reward to
inventive activity. The American Economic Review, 61(4), 561–574.
51
Kacperczyk, M. & Schnabl, P. (2010). When Safe Proved Risky: Commercial Paper during
the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 24(1), 29–50.
König, P. J. & Pothier, D. (2016). Too Much of a Good Thing? - A Theory of Short-Term
Debt as a Sorting Device. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 26, 100–114.
Kuong, J. C.-F. (2015). Self-fulfilling fire sales: Fragility of collateralised short-term debt
markets. Working Paper.
Malherbe, F. (2014). Self-fulfilling liquidity dry-ups. The Journal of Finance, 69(2),
947–970.
Morris, S. & Shin, H. S. (2003). Global games: theory and applications. In L. P. Hansen,
S. J. Turnovsky, & M. Dewatripont (Eds.), Advances in Economics and Econometrics
(pp. 56–114). Cambridge University Press.
Morris, S. & Shin, H. S. (2004a). Coordination risk and the price of debt. European
Economic Review, 48(1), 133–153.
Morris, S. & Shin, H. S. (2004b). Liquidity Black Holes. Review of Finance, 8(1), 1–18.
Plantin, G. (2009). Learning by Holding and Liquidity. Review of Economic Studies,
76(1), 395–412.
Pozsar, Z., Adrian, T., Ashcraft, A. B., & Boesky, H. (2010). Shadow banking. Staff
Reports 458, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Rochet, J.-C. & Vives, X. (2004). Coordination Failures and the Lender of Last Resort:
Was Bagehot Right After All? Journal of the European Economic Association, 2(6),
1116–1147.
Stein, J. C. (2012). Monetary policy as financial stability regulation. The Quarterly






SFB 649 Discussion Paper Series 2016 
 
For a complete list of Discussion Papers published by the SFB 649, 




001 "Downside risk and stock returns: An empirical analysis of the long-run 
and short-run dynamics from the G-7 Countries" by Cathy Yi-Hsuan 
Chen, Thomas C. Chiang and Wolfgang Karl Härdle, January 2016. 
002 "Uncertainty and Employment Dynamics in the Euro Area and the US" by 
Aleksei Netsunajev and  Katharina Glass, January 2016. 
003 "College Admissions with Entrance Exams: Centralized versus 
Decentralized" by Isa E. Hafalir, Rustamdjan Hakimov, Dorothea Kübler 
and Morimitsu Kurino, January 2016. 
004 "Leveraged ETF options implied volatility paradox: a statistical study" by 
Wolfgang Karl Härdle, Sergey Nasekin and Zhiwu Hong, February 2016. 
005 "The German Labor Market Miracle, 2003 -2015: An Assessment" by 
Michael C. Burda, February 2016. 
006 "What Derives the Bond Portfolio Value-at-Risk: Information Roles of 
Macroeconomic and Financial Stress Factors" by Anthony H. Tu and 
Cathy Yi-Hsuan Chen, February 2016. 
007 "Budget-neutral fiscal rules targeting inflation differentials" by Maren 
Brede, February 2016. 
008 "Measuring the benefit from reducing income inequality in terms of GDP" 
by Simon Voigts, February 2016. 
009 "Solving DSGE Portfolio Choice Models with Asymmetric Countries" by 
Grzegorz R. Dlugoszek, February 2016. 
010 "No Role for the Hartz Reforms? Demand and Supply Factors in the 
German Labor Market, 1993-2014" by Michael C. Burda and Stefanie 
Seele, February 2016. 
011 "Cognitive Load Increases Risk Aversion" by Holger Gerhardt, Guido P. 
Biele, Hauke R. Heekeren, and Harald Uhlig, March 2016. 
012 "Neighborhood Effects in Wind Farm Performance: An Econometric 
Approach" by Matthias Ritter, Simone Pieralli and Martin Odening, March 
2016. 
013 "The importance of time-varying parameters in new Keynesian models 
with zero lower bound" by Julien Albertini and Hong Lan, March 2016. 
014 "Aggregate Employment, Job Polarization and Inequalities: A 
Transatlantic Perspective" by Julien Albertini and Jean Olivier Hairault, 
March 2016. 
015 "The Anchoring of Inflation Expectations in the Short and in the Long 
Run" by Dieter Nautz, Aleksei Netsunajev and Till Strohsal, March 2016. 
016 "Irrational Exuberance and Herding in Financial Markets" by Christopher 
Boortz, March 2016. 
017 "Calculating Joint Confidence Bands for Impulse Response Functions 
using Highest Density Regions" by Helmut Lütkepohl, Anna Staszewska-
Bystrova and Peter Winker, March 2016. 
018 "Factorisable Sparse Tail Event Curves with Expectiles" by Wolfgang K. 
Härdle, Chen Huang and Shih-Kang Chao, March 2016. 
019 "International dynamics of inflation expectations" by Aleksei Netšunajev 
and Lars Winkelmann, May 2016. 
020 "Academic Ranking Scales in Economics: Prediction and Imdputation" by 






SFB 649, Spandauer Straße 1, D-10178 Berlin 
http://sfb649.wiwi.hu-berlin.de 
 
This research was supported by the Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft through the SFB 649 "Economic Risk". 
 
SFB 649, Spandauer Straße 1, D- 0178 Berlin 
http://sfb649. iwi.hu-berlin.de 
 
This r search was supported by the Deutsche 






SFB 649 Discussion Paper Series 2016 
 
For a complete list of Discussion Papers published by the SFB 649, 




021 "CRIX or evaluating blockchain based currencies" by Simon Trimborn 
and Wolfgang Karl Härdle, May 2016. 
022 "Towards a national indicator for urban green space provision and 
environmental inequalities in Germany: Method and findings" by Henry 
Wüstemann, Dennis Kalisch, June 2016. 
023 "A Mortality Model for Multi-populations: A Semi-Parametric Approach" 
by Lei Fang, Wolfgang K. Härdle and Juhyun Park, June 2016. 
024 "Simultaneous Inference for the Partially Linear Model with a Multivariate 
Unknown Function when the Covariates are Measured with Errors" by 
Kun Ho Kim, Shih-Kang Chao and Wolfgang K. Härdle, August 2016. 
025 "Forecasting Limit Order Book Liquidity Supply-Demand Curves with 
Functional AutoRegressive Dynamics" by Ying Chen, Wee Song Chua and 
Wolfgang K. Härdle, August 2016. 
026 "VAT multipliers and pass-through dynamics" by Simon Voigts, August 
2016. 
027 "Can a Bonus Overcome Moral Hazard? An Experiment on Voluntary 
Payments, Competition, and Reputation in Markets for Expert Services" 
by Vera Angelova and Tobias Regner, August 2016. 
028 "Relative Performance of Liability Rules: Experimental Evidence" by Vera 
Angelova, Giuseppe Attanasi, Yolande Hiriart, August 2016. 
029 "What renders financial advisors less treacherous? On commissions and 
reciprocity" by Vera Angelova, August 2016. 
030 "Do voluntary payments to advisors improve the quality of 
financial advice? An experimental sender-receiver game" by Vera 
Angelova and Tobias Regner, August 2016. 
031 "A first econometric analysis of the CRIX family" by Shi Chen, Cathy Yi-
Hsuan Chen, Wolfgang Karl Härdle, TM Lee and Bobby Ong, August 
2016. 
032 "Specification Testing in Nonparametric Instrumental Quantile 
Regression" by Christoph Breunig, August 2016. 
033 "Functional Principal Component Analysis for Derivatives of Multivariate 
Curves" by Maria Grith, Wolfgang K. Härdle, Alois Kneip and Heiko 
Wagner, August 2016. 
034 "Blooming Landscapes in the West? - German reunification and the price 
of land." by Raphael Schoettler and Nikolaus Wolf, September 2016. 
035 "Time-Adaptive Probabilistic Forecasts of Electricity Spot Prices with 
Application to Risk Management." by Brenda López Cabrera , Franziska 
Schulz, September 2016. 
036 "Protecting Unsophisticated Applicants in School Choice through 
Information Disclosure" by Christian Basteck and Marco Mantovani, 
September 2016. 
037 "Cognitive Ability and Games of School Choice" by Christian Basteck and 
Marco Mantovani, Oktober 2016. 
038 "The Cross-Section of Crypto-Currencies as Financial Assets: An 
Overview" by Hermann Elendner, Simon Trimborn, Bobby Ong and Teik 
Ming Lee, Oktober 2016. 
039 "Disinflation and the Phillips Curve: Israel 1986-2015" by Rafi Melnick 







SFB 649, Spandauer Straße 1, D-10178 Berlin 
http://sfb649.wiwi.hu-berlin.de 
 
This research was supported by the Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft through the SFB 649 "Economic Risk". 
 
SFB 649, Spandauer Straße 1, D- 0178 Berlin 
http://sfb649. iwi.hu-berlin.de 
 
This r search was supported by the Deutsche 






SFB 649 Discussion Paper Series 2016 
 
For a complete list of Discussion Papers published by the SFB 649, 




040 "Principal Component Analysis in an Asymmetric Norm" by Ngoc M. Tran, 
Petra Burdejová, Maria Osipenko and Wolfgang K. Härdle, October 2016. 
041 "Forward Guidance under Disagreement - Evidence from the Fed's Dot 
Projections" by Gunda-Alexandra Detmers, October 2016. 
042 "The Impact of a Negative Labor Demand Shock on Fertility - Evidence 
from the Fall of the Berlin Wall" by Hannah Liepmann, October 2016. 
043 "Implications of Shadow Bank Regulation for Monetary Policy at the Zero 
Lower Bound" by Falk Mazelis, October 2016. 
044 "Dynamic Contracting with Long-Term Consequences: Optimal CEO 
Compensation and Turnover" by Suvi Vasama, October 2016. 
045 "Information Acquisition and Liquidity Dry-Ups" by Philipp Koenig and 






SFB 649, Spandauer Straße 1, D-10178 Berlin 
http://sfb649.wiwi.hu-berlin.de 
 
This research was supported by the Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft through the SFB 649 "Economic Risk". 
 
SFB 649, Spandauer Straße 1, D- 0178 Berlin 
http://sfb649. iwi.hu-berlin.de 
 
This r search was supported by the Deutsche 
Forschun sgemeinschaft throug  the SFB 649 "Ec nomic Risk". 
 
